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Executive Summary
As the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights, the U.S. military faces a world that
is more volatile and complex than ever before. The Department of Defense’s primary ground
force, the U.S. Army, bears primary responsibility for leading population-centric stability
operations, which involve establishing security, providing humanitarian relief, restoring essential
services, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. This paper examines the Army’s recent
experiences with stability operations and considers whether economic programs at the “micro”
level can provide an important capability to tactical units--“tactical economics.” Employing
economic interventions effectively is extremely difficult, as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
have demonstrated. To prepare for future stability operations, the U.S. Army can benefit from an
assessment of its current capabilities. Analysis indicates that adoption of an “evidence-based”
approach to tactical economics, guided by insights provided by empirical social science, can
provide a powerful nonlethal option by which tactical commanders can shape the security
environment.
Research Questions
1. Why were the U.S. military’s tactical economic efforts largely unsuccessful in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
2. What lessons can the U.S. Army learn from the international development community and
empirical social science research?
3. How can the U.S. Army more effectively employ tactical economics to shape the security
environment?
Methodology
This paper uses an informal Capability Needs Analysis (CNA) to identify possible
“capability gaps” in regard to employing economic programs at the tactical level. Since the
international community faces a similar problem set when conducting humanitarian relief and
economic development in conflict-affected regions, development literature and best practices
provide a lens with which to assess capability gaps and propose solutions.
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Key Findings
● A decade ago, the international development community identified an “evaluation gap”
due to lack of impact evaluations of economic programs.
● The recent “credibility revolution” in empirical social science has provided powerful
tools with which to assess program effectiveness and identify causal effects. This
evidence-based approach has proven effective in improving program outcomes. By
adopting a similar evidence-based approach, the Army can more effectively employ
economic programs to shape security environments.
● An informal CNA identified capability gaps in three categories (Doctrine, Education, and
Personnel/Expertise) and generated five possible solutions to address the gaps:
1. Update Army economic doctrine
2. Revise internal economics education
3. Expand external economics education
4. Develop internal economics expertise
5. Acquire external economics expertise
● Evaluation of available policy options indicates that the highest payoff solutions be
prioritized:
Priority #1: Expand external economics education
Priority #2: Acquire external economics expertise
Priority #3: Update Army economic doctrine.
Recommendations
Short Term (1-2 years)
1. Expand executive education and broadening programs for Army leaders.
2. Develop stronger ties with the social science research community.
3. Thoroughly analyze CERP data from Iraq and Afghanistan.
4. Update informal doctrine using insights from empirical social science.
Medium Term (3-5 years)
1. Formalize relationships with the social science community.
2. Revise key stability and COIN field manuals.
Long Term (6-10 years)
1. Revise Army professional military education (PME).
2. Establish a “Tactical Economics Center of Excellence” to coordinate research
and evaluation efforts.
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List of Acronyms
ADRP

Army Doctrine Reference Publication

AOC

Army Operating Concept

ARCIC

U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center

AWFC

Army Warfighting Challenge
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Commander’s Emergency Response Program
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Counterinsurgency

CNA

Capability Needs Analysis

DOD

Department of Defense

DOS

Department of State

DOTMLPF

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel,
Facilities

FORSCOM

U.S. Army Forces Command

FM

Field Manual

MOP

Measure of Performance

MOE

Measure of Effectiveness

PME

Professional Military Education

PRT

Provincial Reconstruction Team

QDR

Quadrennial Defense Review

RCT

Randomized Controlled Trial

SIGACT

Significant Activity

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGIR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

TRADOC

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

ULO

Unified Land Operations

USAID

United States Agency for International Development
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Introduction
After more than a decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military faces a
world that is more volatile and unpredictable than ever before, a fact recognized by the
Department of Defense (DOD). In a shift from away from large-scale conflict, the U.S. military
expects to more regularly conduct population-centric operations in volatile regions. The 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlights two central challenges: operations within
“fragile” states and an uncertain budget environment. It also makes clear the importance of
preparation for a “full spectrum of possible operations.”1 Economic interventions have
historically been a vital nonlethal shaping operation, although have not always proven
themselves cost effective.
The U.S. Army’s stability manual highlights the fact that in U.S. history, the military has
fought only eleven conventional conflicts, a number dwarfed by the hundreds of other operations
focused on stability tasks.2 As DOD’s primary ground force, the U.S. Army is mandated to
assume the lead in Unified Land Operations (ULO) and generally has responsibility for stability
and reconstruction operations. Within context of the QDR, the recently-published Army
Operating Concept (AOC) mandates that the Army be able to “win in a complex world.” In
contrast to operations during the Cold War, when the U.S. military faced a known enemy in
known terrain, both of these, along with future coalitions, are constantly changing. As both the
military and the international development community have found, the effects of economic
interventions are much more complicated than previously thought. Consequently, the Army

1
2

Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” March 2014, p. iii.
Department of the Army, “Unified Land Operations,” (ADRP 3-0), May 2012, p. 1-1.
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needs new tools to both update its current understanding and continually adapt its knowledge in
the face of constantly-changing threats.
Success in this environment requires consideration of eight interconnected operational
variables, as described in ADRP 5-0: political, military, economic, social, information,
infrastructure, physical environment, and time.3 The U.S. Army has developed capabilities to
address each of these variables. Economics is one of the areas in which the U.S. military--along
with many other agencies--has struggled significantly in an increasingly complex operating
environment, which usually includes conditions of conflict or fragility.4 Adding to the
complexity is that economic interventions, such as the Commander’s Emergency Response
Program (CERP), can simultaneously impact multiple economic and social variables for good or
ill.
Economic efforts have occurred at various echelons within combat zones. In this paper, I
draw a distinction between “macro” and “micro” economic programs. Whereas “macro”
programs aim to create favorable conditions within the macro economy (such as trade policy, the
financial system, etc.) activities that affect the population most directly are those conducted by
units operating in proximity to the people. I will thus use the term “tactical economics” to denote
economic programs and tools designed to be used by tactical level units (brigade and below,
including Provincial Reconstruction Teams) to influence local populations. Tactical economics is
neither a doctrinal nor widely-used term. The only mention within the literature is a U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College thesis by Iven Sugai.5 In this paper, he develops a

Department of the Army, “The Operations Process,” (ADRP 5-0), May 2012.
Fragility, as defined by risk indicators in “Fragile States Index 2015,” Fund for Peace.
5
MAJ Ivan T. Sugai, “Tactical Economics: The U.S. Army’s Tactical Contribution to Economic
Development,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012.
3

4
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framework by which Army units can contribute to economic development during stability
operations despite lack of expertise in the area. This paper builds upon this concept by proposing
that the Army fill this expertise gap through stronger ties to the academic social science research
community.
When viewed as a “shaping operation,” tactical economics can provide additional
nonlethal options for tactical commanders to shape the security environment during unified land
operations.6 Unfortunately, employing economic interventions effectively is extremely difficult,
as recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have illustrated. They are exponentially more
difficult under conditions of conflict. The difficulty is compounded further when conducted by
an organization not designed to conduct economic interventions. This is the threefold challenge
faced by the U.S. Army, an organization often confronted by intractable economic issues in the
developing world, yet charged with a primary mission to “fight and win [the] Nation’s wars.”7
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the U.S. Army’s capabilities in employing
tactical economics and propose steps to improve them using an evidence-based approach.
Arguably, the U.S. Army should not attempt become USAID or the World Bank, but should
leverage every tool at its disposal to accomplish its security mission. Although the U.S. military
has encountered difficulty with past economic interventions, it should not dismiss them as a
potentially powerful tool to contribute to “Army Warfighting Challenge 2: Shape the Security
Environment.”8 I seek to do this by considering the following research questions:

A shaping operation is “an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through
effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain.” ADRP 3-0, p. 1-12.
7
U.S. Army website, “Mission,” accessed January 2016.
8
ARCIC, “Army Warfighting Challenges,” December 2015.
6
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1. Why were the U.S. military’s tactical economic efforts largely unsuccessful in Iraq
and Afghanistan?
2. What lessons can the U.S. Army learn from the international development community
and empirical social science research?
3. How can the U.S. Army more effectively employ tactical economics to shape the
security environment?

Background/Problem Statement
The U.S. military has a long history of engaging in post-conflict stability operations.9 As
the organization usually best positioned to restore order in the wake of combat operations,
“reluctant economists” within the U.S. Army often bear the responsibility for initial efforts to
rebuild infrastructure and restoring a functioning economy. 10 The most prominent example of
success was the U.S. reconstruction of West Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War
II. The U.S. military subsequently played varying roles in economic interventions in Korea,
Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, but largely focused on providing security. In
Afghanistan, and Iraq, the military’s role in economic stabilization, reconstruction, and
development once again came to the forefront.
The failure of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a stark contrast
to post-World War II success. U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan brought the military’s role
in economic development to the forefront. The top-down “whole-of-government” approach to
reconstruction, which resembled the post-World War II model, quickly backfired. Despite
infusing vast amounts of money, reconstruction efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan failed at a
9

Stability operations include establishing security, restoring essential services, and supporting economics
and infrastructure development. Department of the Army, “Stability Operations.” (ADRP 3-07), August
2012.
10
COL(Ret.) Jeffrey Peterson, “Towards a Post-Conflict Economic Development Doctrine,” in Summit on
Entrepreneurship and Expeditionary Economics, Kauffman Foundation, 2010.
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strategic level, as both countries have neither been stabilized nor developed sustainable
economies. The Special Investigator General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) found reconstruction
efforts to have been “an abysmal failure.”11 The agency found that DOD spent between $700 and
$800 million and “accomplished nothing.”12 In total, U.S. reconstruction spending exceeded $60
billion in Iraq and $110 billion in Afghanistan--figures which dwarf the $29.6 billion and $15.2
billion price tags for successful reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan, respectively, from
1946-1952.13 Much of the latter aid was in fact repaid by the two former Axis countries.
Numerous economic programs were developed within an interagency context, but the
Commander’s Emergency Relief Fund (CERP) placed financial resources directly into the hands
of tactical commanders in order to impact both security and economic development
simultaneously.14 This paper will hence focus on use of CERP as the Army’s primary tool to
employ economics at the tactical level. CERP was established in Iraq in 2003 by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (the post-invasion transitional U.S. government) using seized Iraqi assets
and later expanded to Afghanistan.15 The original purpose was to address urgent local needs
requiring immediate action by commanders and largely unencumbered by bureaucratic controls.
Empirical research has shown, surprisingly, that the vast majority of reconstruction spending in

Joe Gould, “SIGAR: Pentagon’s Economic Development in Afghanistan ‘Accomplished Nothing,’”
Military Times, 2014.
12
Gould.
13
2005 Dollars; Nina Serafino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick K. Nanto, U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq,
Germany and Japan Compared,” Congressional Research Service, March 23, 2006; SIGIR, “Learning
From Iraq: A Final Report,” March 2013; SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” July
2015.
14
Nathan W. Toronto, “Stability Economics: The Economic Foundations of Security in Post-Conflict
Environments,” U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2012, p. 1.
15
Crane, et al., “Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations,” RAND
Corporation, 2009, p. 24.
11
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Iraq (non-CERP) had no violence-reducing effect, reasons for which are still largely unknown.16
The magnitude of CERP spending was massive, totaling $4.12 billion in Iraq.17 In Afghanistan,
2011 CERP spending equaled 5 percent of the country’s annual GDP.18 Despite wide-ranging
opinions regarding the Army’s appropriate role economic reconstruction and development, the
level of funds allocated have in many ways made it a de facto member of the international
development community.
The U.S. military faces an “evaluation gap” in determining tactical effect of economic
programs.
Despite vast sums of money spent during stability operations, the U.S. military gained
very little insight into the effectiveness of those funds. As the special investigators for both Iraq
and Afghanistan (SIGIR and SIGAR) have highlighted, DOD has struggled to even account for
billions of dollars it spent on reconstruction, let alone measure specific outcomes. Tragically, due
to insufficient monitoring, evaluation, and analysis, the staggering price tags for reconstruction
brought very little insight into the causal factors for successful interventions. Although military
doctrine explicitly mandates use of performance indicators, the Army lacks a large-scale
capability to gather and analyze data. The preceding failures in economic effectiveness and
outcome evaluation indicate a capability gap in the area of tactical economics.

Eli Berman Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The
Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy, August 2011.
17
SIGIR, “Learning From Iraq: A Final Report,” March 2013, p. 9.
18
Vijaya Ramachandran and Julie Walz, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program in
Afghanistan: Refining U.S. Military Capabilities in Stability and In-Conflict Development Activities,” Center
for Global Development, September 6, 2011.
16
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Methodology
This paper uses an informal capability needs analysis (CNA) approach to better
understand this capability gap and propose solutions to address specific deficiencies. Although I
consider capabilities from the standpoint of the U.S. Army, long term solutions will fall within
the larger DOD context and apply to ground forces in other branches of service involved in land
operations (most notably the Marine Corps). When conducting a CNA, it is necessary to ask four
questions:
1. What must the Army be able to do (required capabilities)?
2. What are current Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel,
Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF) capability solutions to meet those requirements?
3. What are the capabilities gaps?
4. What are potential ways to close the gaps?19
To assess capability gaps and generate potential solutions across DOTMLPF, I evaluate
the U.S. military’s history of economic interventions in light of empirical social science research.
Over the past decade, the social sciences have gained tremendous insight into the effectiveness
of economic interventions in developing and fragile states. Data sources include the following:
●
●
●
●

Government and military reports
Empirical social science research
Case studies
Interviews with military officers and development professionals

Why look to the international development community for best practices?
The international development community seeks to achieve many of the same goals
within fragile states and conflict-affected regions, including humanitarian relief, restoring
essential services, and promoting economic growth. Like the U.S. military, it has also struggled

19

Matthew DiGiosaffatte, “Capability Needs Analysis,” ARCIC, September 27, 2013.
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with achieving desired results. Decades ago, economist Jeffrey Sachs postulated that poor
countries suffered from a “poverty trap,” which simply required investment sufficient capital to
overcome.20 However, “simple answers” proved ineffective. Despite $2.3 trillion in foreign aid
which flowed from the developed countries to the developing world over the past fifty years,
extreme poverty has been significantly reduced, but not eliminated.21 As a result, the
development economics field has moved away from “universal answers” toward a more
evidence-based approach, which uses rigorous quantitative data to determine which programs
work and why.22
The insights we now benefit from have not always been available. A decade ago, the
international development community also faced an “evaluation gap,” meaning that it lacked
significant evidence regarding program effectiveness. A 2006 report by the Center for Global
Development's Evaluation Gap Working Group highlighted this problem, stating that the
community found itself “bemoaning the lack of knowledge about what really works.”23 During
the following ten years, the evaluation gap has been addressed through an explosion in number
and quality of impact evaluations. Empirical economics enjoyed a “credibility revolution” as a
result, through use of an evidence-based approach, which incorporates hypothesis-based
interventions evaluated using statistical methods.24 As Dr. Christia of MIT recently pointed out,

20

Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, 2005.
An estimated 12.7 percent of global population lives in extreme poverty. The World Bank, “Poverty
Overview,” October 7, 2015; William R. Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid
the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, 2006, p. 4.
22
Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor Economics, 2011.
23
Evaluation Gap Working Group. “When Will We Ever Learn? Improving Lives Through Impact
Evaluation,” Center for Global Development, May 2006, p. 8.
24
Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, “The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How
Better Research Design is Taking the Con Out of Econometrics,” NBER, March 2010.
21
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there has been a surge in social science research focused understanding the causal factors driving
the dynamics of intrastate conflict rather than interstate war.25
Despite this evaluation surge, many challenges remain due to the inherent difficulty of
conducting impact evaluation and applying lessons learned to interventions. The number of
impact evaluations is still small compared to the number of open research questions.26 The
evaluation gap is even more severe for development during conflict. According to OECD
research, there has been “little to no evaluation activity in settings of violent conflict,” which
makes it very difficult to understand the impact of interventions.27 While some of this data can
be collected remotely (through satellite imagery of city lights at night, for example), it is difficult
to accurately interpret data without the human element, which creates a need for combining
“technology with shoe-leather.”28 The U.S. Army has a comparative advantage in the latter, as
security capabilities provide access to violent areas.
Empirical social science can provide valuable new insights to population-centric military
operations.
The “credibility revolution” that occurred in empirical social science over the past
decade, enabled by increasing use of impact evaluations, has begun to shed light on the causal
factors behind interventions.29 Such information is particularly important because economic
programs have often been found not only to have been ineffective, but to create adverse effects.
These advancing analytical tools are increasing our understanding of the linkages between
economics and conflict, though much remains to be learned. Due to the complexity of
25

Dr. Fotini Christia, remarks at the Future of War Conference, Washington DC, March 10, 2016.
William D. Savedoff, “The Evaluation Gap is Closing, But Not Closed,” Center for Global Development,
March 24, 2015.
27
OECD, “Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility,” 2012, p. 7.
28
Christia.
29
Angrist and Pischke.
26
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conducting such studies, a limited community of researchers drives much of this research. It is
important to note that not all studies are created equal. As Harrison and Meyers point out, a
“hierarchy of evidence” exists due to varying levels of randomization.30 As Appendix A
illustrates, randomized controlled trials (RCTs) provide the “gold standard” of studies since the
randomization allows the study to identify causality, not just correlation. The disadvantage to
randomization is that it increases the difficulty and expense of any study, and in many cases
creating an untreated control group can violate ethical codes. Fortunately, quasi-experimental
techniques have advanced significantly, which allows researchers to derive randomization
passively through natural experiments.31
The following tables provide examples of the insights provided by social science (see
appendix B for more complete list of studies used in this paper). The knowledge frontier for
studies focused on conflict is not far and the body of literature is still relatively small, with the
majority of these papers having been published only within the past few years.

Todd Harrison and John Speed Meyers, “Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime
Contracting and Expeditionary Economics,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2012.
31
Examples include use of instrumental variables, regression discontinuity, and difference-in-differences.
30
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Table 1: Example Empirical Studies in International Development
Author(s)
Miguel and
Kremer

Paper
“Worms: Identifying
Impacts on Education
and Health in the
Presence of Treatment
Externalities” (2004)

Topic/Type of Study
School-based deworming
intervention in Kenya
RCT

Findings
-Deworming programs improved
health and decreased school
absenteeism by one-quarter but did
not have observable effects on school
achievement.
-Effect observed among both treated
and untreated schools due to a
spillover effect.

Blattman and
Annan

Nunn and Qian

“Can Employment
Reduce Lawlessness
and Rebellion? A Field
Experiment with HighRisk Men in a Fragile
State” (2015)

Rehabilitation program for
ex-fighters in Liberia

-Program caused men to reduce illicit
activities.

RCT

-Largest impact came from contingent
future cash payments.

“US Food Aid and Civil
Conflict” (2014)

U.S. food aid

U.S. food aid increased incidence and
duration of civil conflict in recipient
countries.

Natural Experiment

By discovering causal effects through either an RCT or natural experiment, the three
studies above provided invaluable insight into their topics. The policy-relevant conclusions had
the potential to guide allocation of resources. In the deworming study for example, Miguel and
Kremer found that deworming children was less expensive than alternatives for increasing school
attendance. Although it brought a positive externality benefiting nearby untreated schools, it did
not have an observable impact on test scores. Such nuanced findings allow policymakers to make
better-informed decisions regarding interventions in complex environments.
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Table 2: Key Empirical Studies Pertaining to Conflict and Military Operations
Author(s)

Paper

Berman, Felter
Shapiro, and
Troland

“Modest, Secure and
Informed: Successful
Development in Conflict
Zones” (2013)

Topic/Type of Study
Effect of CERP spending
during the 2007 Iraq
surge
Natural Experiment
(Regression Discontinuity)

Findings
-Large reconstruction programs
increased violence.
-CERP was most effective when
projects were small (<$50k), troop
strength was high, and development
expertise was available.
-Small projects were three times more
effective when a PRT operated in the
district

Beath, Christia,
and Enikolopov

“Winning Hearts and
Minds Through
Development: Evidence
from a Field Experiment
in Afghanistan”
(2012)

Afghan National Solidarity
Program (NSP)

-Village participation in NSP improved
perceptions of well-being, attitudes
toward government, and local security.

RCT
-Effect did not occur in areas with high
initial violence.
-Results suggest minimum security
threshold for development programs to
be effective.

Crost, Felter,
and Johnston

Iyengar,
Monten, and
Hanson

“Conditional Cash
Transfers, Civil Conflict
and Insurgent
Influence: Experimental
Evidence from the
Philippines” (2016)

Effect of conditional cash
transfers (CCTs) on
conflict in the Philippines
RCT

-The effect may have been due to
shifting violence to untreated villages

“Building Peace: The
Impact of Aid on the
Labor Market for
Insurgent” (2011)

Effect of employment on
violence in Iraq

-Labor intensive programs reduced
insurgent violence

Observational

-10% increase in labor-intensive public
works spending reduced violence by
10%

-CCTs reduced conflict and insurgent
influence in villages

Empirical studies have demonstrated that tactical economics can work (with limitations).
The four papers in Table 2 demonstrate that economic programs can have a measurable
impact on the security environment. Using a natural experiment provided by the 2007 troop
surge in Iraq, Berman, et al. documented a causal link between CERP spending and reduced
violence as measured by the military’s significant activity (SIGACT) data. However, the effect
was only observed with small projects, whereas large projects increased violence. Beath, et al.
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found that the National Solidarity Program (NSP) improved local security and improved villager
perceptions of the government, but only above a minimum threshold of security. Crost, et al.
found that in the Philippines, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) reduced conflict and insurgent
influence by the government. Lastly, Iyengar, et al. demonstrated that increased spending on
labor-intensive programs in Iraq reduced insurgent violence.
Significant caveats exist when approaching statistical studies along the lines of both
internal and external validity concerns. For example, even if a study possesses high internal
validity, there is no guarantee that a study conducted in one region will have external validity in
another region. Thus, while it is tempting to apply the results of studies conducted in the
Philippines to Afghanistan, the causal relationships may not hold. Despite such limitations, the
conclusions of empirical studies can provide actionable hypotheses to commanders regarding
how to allocate limited stability, reconstruction, and development resources.
Insufficient data collection has limited understanding of CERP outcomes
A 2015 SIGAR report found that DOD could not account for $1.3 billion in CERP funds
in Afghanistan.32 A 2011 U.S. Inspector General report similarly found inadequate reporting of
CERP payments, as between 2008 and 2010, forces in Afghanistan failed to record data on 6,157
of 8,509 CERP payments exceeding $1 billion.33 As Berman, et al. pointed out, major challenge
in applying an evidence-based approach is the difficulty of obtaining data, an effort which
requires conscious effort and resourcing by management.34 Despite detailed reporting
requirements (see Appendix C), databases were not consistently updated and the Army Budget
Steve Straehley, “What Happened to $1.3 Billion of Taxpayer Money Sent Directly to U.S. Military
Officers in Afghanistan? Pentagon Won’t Say,” AllGov, April 27, 2015.
33
U.S. Inspector General, “Management Improvements Needed in Commander's Emergency Response
Program in Afghanistan,” November 21, 2011, p. i.
34
Eli Berman, Joseph Felter, Ethan B. Kapstein, and Jake Shapiro, “How Empirical Studies of Violence
(Can) Help Policymakers,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2015.
32
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Office tracked CERP projects in aggregate, but not on an individual basis. As a result, DOD
lacks an accurate and comprehensive picture of what these projects accomplished in Iraq. The
fact that CERP data is at best a “rough approximation” of actual inputs casts doubt on the
commander narratives and analysis based on that data.35
Evaluation efforts have largely focused on inputs rather than outcomes.
Comments by John Sopko (SIGAR) summed up the incentive problem related to
project inputs:
“Performance does not matter in many of the situations...I’ve had a number of
contracting officers in all of the agencies...say, ‘I get my promotion on how much money
I put on contract, period. Not whether the contract accomplishing anything.’”36
Similarly, in discussing his PRT experience in Afghanistan, diplomat Kael Weston noted that
“[t]here was pressure early on to do a lot of building of things: to build roads and projects and to
spend money.” 37 In 2007, his team spent $53 million in one year to build 50-60 schools, of
which less than half remained functional several years later.38 Similarly, numerous reports have
documented little effort within the U.S. military to assess measures of effectiveness.39 A 2008
Princeton study found that large-scale evaluation of PRT outcomes in Iraq or Afghanistan has yet
to occur.40

35

Ibid
Sheila MacVicar, “SIGAR: We built an Afghanistan they can’t afford,” Aljazeera America. June 17,
2015.
37
Rachel Martin, “Revisiting Afghanistan's Reconstruction Teams,” National Public Radio, April 17, 2013.
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Lack of both data collection and analysis has created a CERP “evaluation gap.”
Regarding CERP expenditures, Senator Claire McCaskill stated in 2011 that “[t]here is a
disconnect between what the commanders in the field want to have happen and what actually
happens.”41 As mentioned above, CERP spending had positive effects, but the U.S. military was
unable to measure or communicate these effects. ARCIC director, Lieutenant General McMaster
highlighted the importance of better analyzing data in partnership with social science in order to
avoid “confus[ing] activity for progress toward objectives.”42 The missing evaluative capability
is one of the primary motivations underlying this study.
Adopting an evidence-based approach is possible if leaders perceive tactical value in
“economic intelligence.”
As Anderson and Andrew proposed, tactical units can gather “economic intelligence” which they
channel back to those with expertise in interpreting data and designing economic programs.43
Similarly, Sugai proposed that the Army can provide the greatest contribution to economic
development by collecting information that, when combined with interpretation by economic
professionals, can contribute to a commander’s situational understanding. 44 To frame use of this
information, it may be helpful to draw a parallel to scout units within the Army, the primary
mission of which is to obtain information for a unit commander.
According to military doctrine, scouts do not assume a decisive role in defeating the
enemy. Rather, their operations are assessed not only by direct effect on an enemy force, but
more so on the quality of the information flow they provide, which can reduce uncertainty and
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enable decision-making.45 Similarly, the outcome of every economic intervention may not be
successful, but it can still provide valuable information regarding what does not work in a
specific context. By testing small, hypothesis-based pilot programs (similar to employing small
scout units), commanders can acquire large amounts of information at relatively low cost and
risk. Even failure to find causality can be valuable, just as it is valuable to know where enemy
forces are not located. However, Army culture often views lack of positive results as failure,
which poses an obstacle to the experimental mindset required to adopt an evidence-based
approach.

The U.S. Army’s Required Economic Capabilities
The first step in conducting a CNA is determining required capabilities. DOD and Army
doctrine both mandate proficiency in economic tasks as part of both stability and
counterinsurgency operations. They also require the Army to evaluate the impacts of these
activities. The 2014 QDR sets out stability and counterinsurgency operations as one of eleven
enduring armed forces missions in which the Army plays a major role.46 In reissuing the 2005
DOD Directive on stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations, DOD
Instruction 3000.05 requires that the U.S. military take the lead in restoring essential services,
rebuilding critical infrastructure, and providing humanitarian assistance until it can transition
responsibility to other agencies or the local government.47 Both the DOD stability manual (Joint
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Publication 3-07) and the Army Operating Concept echo this guidance in highlighting the
importance of essential services, infrastructure, and relief efforts.48
These statements make the necessity of economic programs clear. In fact, the types of
operations closely resemble the activities conducted by international humanitarian and
development organizations such as USAID or the World Bank. The primary difference, however,
are the underlying organizational missions. Ultimately, the Army is mandated to establish
security rather than pursue philanthropic objectives. Military ground forces are usually the only
organizations available to conduct such tasks during or immediately after a conflict, as former
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted:
“We know that at least in the early phases of any conflict, contingency or natural
disaster, the U.S. military – as has been the case throughout our history – will be
responsible for security, reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and public
services. I make it a point to reinforce this message before military audiences, to ensure
that the lessons learned and relearned in recent years are not forgotten or again pushed
to the margins.”49

Identifying Capability Gaps
Assessing the Army’s economic stabilization capabilities using a DOTMLPF framework
(Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities)
can enable a more detailed understanding of areas in which the Army’s capabilities are lacking.
After conducting the analysis, gaps emerge in three primary categories: doctrine, education, and
personnel. Figure 1 summarizes this finding:
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Figure 1: Research Design/Capability Gaps

DOCTRINE
“The way we fight, e.g., emphasizing combined arms maneuver and wide area security.” 50
Analysis questions:
● “Is there existing doctrine that addresses or relates to the need?”
● “Are there operating procedures in place that are NOT being followed which contribute
to the identified need?”51

To answer the questions above, I examine the primary manuals governing military
economic interventions: the Army’s counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24) and the manual
for stability operations (ADRP 3-07). I will also include in the analysis the “Commander’s Guide
to Money as a Weapons System” published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL),
which provides an important resource describing current tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs) for commanders and staff. A review of the preceding publications shows that Army
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doctrine recognizes the importance of economics in population-centric warfare and provides a
valuable interagency stability framework, but it has two major deficiencies: lack of specificity
and contradictions with empirical data.
Lack of specificity within doctrine limits effective implementation.
Current doctrine instructs commanders to employ economic tools, but does not provide
sufficient information regarding how to use them. The amount of assumed knowledge is vast-almost to the point where it impossible to execute given current levels of training. This leads to
the danger that commanders will default to more familiar and much better-trained tactics at the
expense of economic tools. For example, FM 3-24 discusses use of integrated monetary shaping
operations (IMSO) and provides a list of potential uses ranging from battle damage repair,
agricultural projects, to education initiatives. The manual provides a list of seven principles for
using money effectively during COIN: host-nation ownership, capacity building, sustainability,
selectivity, partnership, flexibility, and accountability.52 In discussing each, the manual
references best practices of the development community and recommends a close working
relationship with civilian agencies. The problem is that the extremely wide swath of development
initiatives included in infrastructure, education, and agriculture have vexed the international
development community for decades, particularly when conducted under conditions of conflict.
In discussing “lines of effort” into which commanders can organize resources, the two below
illustrate the generalized guidance to the tactical leaders:
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Figure 2: Economic Lines of Effort During Counterinsurgency

Source: Department of the Army. “Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies.” (FM 3-24,
MCWP 3-33.5) May 2014, p. 7-9.
Arguably, these are some of the most difficult tasks even in the absence of conflict. As
with monetary shaping operations, restoring essential services is complex, whereas the economic
development line of effort is almost impossible even to highly-trained experts. Thus, I question
whether there is any value in telling an infantry captain with no formal economic training other
than undergraduate economics courses to “support broad-based economic opportunity.” Not only
is this objective infeasible for someone leading troops under combat conditions, but it is highly
challenging for a development economist. In the worst case, it could divert scarce resources from
a more impactful effort.
Economic stabilization tools are not limited to counterinsurgencies. ADRP 3-07 lays out
the Army’s five primary stability tasks: (1) establish civil security, (2) establish civil control, (3)
restore essential services, (4) support governance, and (5) support economic and infrastructure
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development.53 Tasks 3 and 5 fall firmly in the realm of economic interventions. Restoration of
essential services is a task that military is fairly well experienced, using the SWEAT-MS
framework.54 In regard to Task 5, the manual states that local units should focus on: “recovery
and development focus on generating employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources
into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through micro economics,
and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure.”55 No further guidance follows except
for a discussion of employment generation.
Doctrine conflicts with empirical social science research in key areas.
When Army doctrine discusses topics such as infrastructure reconstruction, employment
generation, and economic growth, it enters a highly complex space. While initiatives in these
areas may appear unambiguously positive, recent data does not provide justification. The
development community has faced a similar experience. In Poor Economics, Banerjee and Duflo
describe a central challenge faced by the international development community:
“More often than not, the weight of the evidence forced us to reassess or even abandon
the theories that we brought with us. But we tried not to do so before we understood
exactly why they were failing and how to adapt them to better describe the world.”56
Similarly, it is vital for the U.S. military to assess the assumptions contained within its
doctrine. Numerous case studies exist in which tactical commanders claim highly successful
impact from economic development efforts.57 While they may very well be correct, determining
causality is extremely difficult. Anecdotal evidence is the least credible within the hierarchy of
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evidence and can easily result in mistaking correlation for causality. This is particularly
dangerous, as in many cases, the wrong type of economic intervention can be worse than doing
nothing.58
Two areas in which doctrine conflicts with research are infrastructure reconstruction and
employment generation. The 2009 “Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System
(MAAWS)” focuses on job creation and infrastructure reconstruction.59 Similarly, at the top of
economic development recommendations in a 2011 CALL handbook is infrastructure
development.60 However, several studies have shown that while spending on small projects can
reduce violence, large projects can actually fuel violence. Most notably, Berman, et al. examined
the effects of CERP spending before and after the 2007 troop surge in Iraq and found that the
vast majority of reconstruction spending in Iraq had no violence-reducing effect.61 Reasons for
this are still largely unknown.62 However, the research team found that CERP projects were five
times more effective in reducing violence when they were small (below $50,000), informed by
the community, and secured by troops. Conversely, large CERP projects (primarily infrastructure
reconstruction) increased conflict, a finding consistent with Kilcullen’s theory of opposed
development, whereby insurgents attempt to disrupt projects in order to discredit the

58

Jake Shapiro, personal interview, September 25, 2015.
Center for Army Lessons Learned,“Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” April 2009,
p. i.
60
Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team: Observations,
Insights, and Lessons,” June 2011, p. 49.
61
Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Erin Troland. “Modest, Secure, and Informed:
Successful Development in Conflict Zones,” American Economic Review, 2013.
62
Eli Berman Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The
Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy, August 2011.
59

27
government.63 This is consistent lessons highlighted by SIGIR: “Focus first on small programs
and projects.”64
The adverse effects of incorrect doctrine can be far-reaching. The reconstruction focus in
Iraq was often on large projects, often scattered, and not unified. The majority of the $20.86
billion Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), for example, was spent on large
infrastructure projects, which is a concern given the preceding results.65 CERP often led to
duplication of efforts by other U.S. agencies. SIGIR found evidence of strategic drift away from
the program’s core mandate to meet urgent, low-level needs. Insufficiently justified projects such
as construction of a $4.2 million hotel at the Baghdad International Airport built using CERP
funds contributed to Congress mandating the end of the program in Iraq in 2011.66
The MAAWS handbook recommends economic initiatives that include hiring military
aged males for projects.67 Research by Iyengar, et al. found that labor-intensive CERP projects
reduced insurgent violence in Iraq, but the relationship is complex.68 The opportunity cost model
underlying this study may not hold, as shown when Berman, et al. tested the prediction that
reduced unemployment would decrease violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines.69
Their data failed to show a positive correlation between unemployment and violence. In fact,
higher unemployment may actually increase effectiveness of counterinsurgency efforts through
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lower information costs (price of anti-insurgent tips to security forces). Thus, low unemployment
could hinder COIN efforts, which makes the prudence of blanket efforts to increase employment
questionable, particularly given a commander’s limited financial resources. The fact that the
study by Berman, et. al, spanned three countries increases its external validity relative to the
Iyengar, et al. study.
Security is an essential precondition for successful reconstruction and development.
Post-conflict reconstruction is not possible unless an area is actually post-conflict. U.S.
experience with the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam bore this out.70 Similarly, Beath, et al.
used an RCT to determine that that the National Solidarity Program, Afghanistan’s largest
development program, had positive effects on villager perceptions of well-being, attitudes
toward the government, and level of security.71 The latter two effects were only observed in
relatively secure areas, which suggests there is a minimum security threshold needed for public
goods and services to have an effect on winning support from the population.
It is important to note that the highly successful reconstruction efforts in Germany and
Japan occurred against the backdrop of a largely peaceful population. Conversely, reconstruction
in Iraq and Afghanistan occurred in the midst of insurgencies. Large infrastructure projects thus
occurred prematurely. A major conclusion reached by SIGIR was that reconstruction should
begin only after security is established.72 Unfortunately, Iraq has yet to become “post-conflict.”73
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Conditionality is a crucial ingredient for program success.
Even providing for basic needs can have adverse effects in fragile or conflict-affected
environments. For example, Nunn and Qian constructed a natural experiment using U.S.
droughts to determine that unconditional food aid can fuel violence in recipient countries
experiencing civil conflict.74 A similar phenomenon was observed during the UN’s 1991
intervention in Somalia as warlords used food aid to increase their power and prolong the
conflict.75 Experience in Southern Sudan can provide a valuable lesson for military economic
efforts, as during 2005-2010, foreign aid donor emphasis on providing basic services at the
expense of security led to increased violence.76 Much of the military’s efforts in restoring
essential services is grounded in the assumption that doing so will win the support of the
population and contribute to stability. However, the experience of the 1st Cavalry Division in
Baghdad in 2004 highlighted the difficulty of restoring essential services, as well as the tenuous
link between services and reduced violence. In 2005, the security situation began to deteriorate,
despite over $700 million along with significant technical expertise invested in infrastructure.77
Although it is not possible to infer causality, the majority of this aid lacked conditionality, fueled
local corruption, and failed to address actual needs of the local population.78

Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, “US Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” American Economic Review, 2014.
James, Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M.
Swanger, Anga R. Timilsi,. America’s Role in Nationbuilding: From Germany to Iraq, RAND Corporation,
2003.
76
OECD, “Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility,” 2012, p. 22.
77
MAJ Anthony P. Barbina, “Comparing Models for the Restoration of Essential Services During
Counterinsurgency Operations,” in “Stability Economics: The Economic Foundations of Security in PostConflict Environments,” 2012, p. 129.
78
Ibid.
74

75

30
Crost, et al. studied the effect of the Philippines largest development program (KALAHICIDSS) on civilian conflict deaths during the period from 2003-2008.79 They found that the
program increased violent activity because insurgent groups attempted to sabotage the program
to prevent the government increasing popular support. While the program exacerbated violence
in the short term it had no long run effects. In a later study, the same authors found that
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) were an effective means of reducing violence in the
Philippines.80 This study reinforces prior findings that conditional and targeted, low level aid can
decrease violence and weaken an insurgency.
LEADERSHIP & EDUCATION
“How we prepare our leaders to lead the fight; from team leader to general; professional
education.”
Analysis questions:
● “Does leadership understand the scope of the problem?”
● “Does leadership have resources at its disposal to correct the issue?”81

Army leadership appears to understand the problem in general, as shown by reports
detailing lack of CERP effectiveness. However, it is not clear that the specific reasons for failure
are understood. Secondly, it appears that current leader education programs do not provide the
resources to address the core issue in future operations.
Professional military education (PME) relies on current military doctrine.
In order to maintain “agile and adaptive leaders,” the Army requires its commissioned
and noncommissioned officers to attend PME at various stages of their careers.82 The curriculum
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is derived from current doctrine, which compounds the deficiencies discussed above. The effects
were observed when tactical commanders pursued economic development as part of COIN
operations. An issue observed in Iraq was that use of CERP “morphed” from its designed role for
tactical commanders to fund quick-impact projects to much larger ones, which according to
Undersecretary of Defense Dov Zakheim problematically led to the military “USAID in
uniform” and resulted in poor outcomes and wasted funds.83 Former commander of MultiNational Force--Iraq, General Odierno, noted that CERP had positive effects, but should not
have been used to fund large projects and should have had a better training program for use.84
Upon reflecting upon his time as a commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General Caslen noted the
value of greater economics training for Army officers, particularly in use of CERP.85
Military professional education does not adequately cover program evaluation.
Program monitoring and evaluation is a relatively new field and is very technical.
Although military doctrine mandates that measures of effectiveness by evaluated, tactical
commanders and staff are generally not exposed to sufficient knowledge to implement and
oversee evaluation systems and to develop the “learning culture” that is necessary for successful
economic interventions.86 Army leaders do not need to know how to conduct the studies, but
they need to understand how to employ and interpret them in the context of operations. While
quantitative data on leader knowledge of evaluation methods is not readily available, a proxy
measure is the U.S. military’s struggle with assessing and communicating CERP effectiveness.
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The level of commander and staff familiarity with evaluation techniques can have a
major effect on their use. Harrison and Meyers point out that although opportunities to conduct
RCTs are extremely limited during combat operations, the military must strive to achieve more
compelling forms of evidence to guide economic decisions.87 USAID is increasingly making use
of impact evaluations to obtain better evidence.88 Similarly, Army commanders can benefit from
such methods.
PERSONNEL
“Availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations.”89
Analysis questions:
● “Is the issue caused, at least in part, by inability or decreased ability to place qualified
and trained personnel in the correct occupational specialties?
● “Are the right personnel in the right positions (skill set match)?”90

Numerous voices have called attention to the military’s lack of expertise in economic
development. 91 This lack of expertise is explained largely by the vast array of mission sets
required—it is impossible to become an expert in every form of operation, both lethal and
nonlethal. While it is not the U.S. Army’s mission to become an international development
agency, it must maintain sufficient expertise to execute the stability tasks stated in ADRP 3-07.
In comparing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to international development best
practices, a gap emerges in regard to expertise in two areas: designing economic interventions
and program evaluation.
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The Army lacks expertise in designing economic interventions.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were created in part to fill the military’s gap in
development and evaluation expertise. First introduced in Afghanistan in 2002, PRTs were
subsequently expanded to Iraq in 2005.92 Their mission was to work with provincial and local
governments to provide essential services to local populations. Unfortunately, PRTs also lacked
sufficient development and evaluation expertise as pointed out by Gauster.93 A SIGAR report
found that in 2009, all U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan had only 35 government civilians.94 The
ensuing “civilian surge” increased government civilian numbers to over 1,300 by 2011, most of
which were part of District Support Teams (DSTs), similar in structure to PRTs but focused on
district-level projects.95 As Berman, et al. found, the presence of PRTs led to a greater reduction
in violence resulting from CERP spending, the impact of PRTs is still relatively unknown, which
warrants further research.96
Official guidance regarding use of CERP funds was intentionally broad in order to
provide flexibility to tactical commanders, but lack of expertise in economic development led to
wide variance in outcomes. Many commanders had very well-intentioned plans along the same
lines, but many of these plans arguably did not pass cost-benefit test, particularly when these
plans did not translate into tactical or strategic success. For example, “Operation Adam Smith,” a
multi-million dollar business-focused initiative intended “revitalize” the commercial district in
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Baghdad, had little impact.”97 Part of the plan involved establishing a business incubator in
Baghdad University. Although this well-intentioned effort by the U.S. Army as assisted by
expertise from the U.S. Department of Commerce, it is difficult to argue that this was the best
use of financial resources.
Numerous other examples exist. For example, a brigade commander developed an
initiative to conduct assessments of small businesses in order to promote stability through small
business grants.98 Another commander used $5 million (10 percent of his unit’s reconstruction
funds) over three months to create a day labor program in Ramadi, which accounted for 70% of
new employment in the city.99 Such anecdotal examples cannot establish causality, of course, but
one wonders in hindsight if the focus on economic development distracted commanders from
investing resources in areas that could have made a quantifiable impact to sustainable security
conditions. If not, the funds could have simply been conserved for future needs, which is a
particular concern in today’s budget-constrained environment.
The Army lacks expertise in program evaluation.
Program evaluation is mandated in doctrine, but given the myriad of conventional and
unconventional threats faced by the Army within the current operating environment there is a
limited amount of intellectual capital with which to evaluate past operations. The Army’s COIN
manual specifies use of an “assessment cell” to track program effectiveness.100 This is
particularly necessary during population-centric operations, since outcomes of similar programs
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may vary greatly from region to region.101 The Center for Army Lessons Learned has
accumulated a large CERP data set, but has not applied the necessary amount of statistical
analysis required to distill sufficient insights that can be applied to future conflicts.102 Specialized
evaluation expertise is necessary due to the challenge posed by the causality question, as one
commander stated: “Even if we can successfully measure an outcome, it’s extremely hard to
know what caused the outcome. There are so many things happening at once that causal
relationships are next to impossible to identify.”103
The Army is not alone in its challenges with evaluation. Within the U.S. government,
both USAID and DOS have struggled with program evaluation.104 As noted earlier, the
international development community is still working to close the evaluation gap. A 2010 OECD
survey found that lack of human capital was a binding constraint, as people qualified to conduct
rigorous impact evaluations are in short supply.105 Lack of funding is a possible cause of the lack
of qualified personnel available to staff the cells. Funding should likely approximate target
program fund allocations set by USAID (3 percent) and DOS (3-5 percent).106 A 2010 OECD
survey found that international aid agencies devoted an average of 0.1 percent of budgets to
evaluation, which is far too low and results in inadequate evaluations.107
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Recommended Solution Approaches (Policy Options)
After identifying the Army’s capability gaps, the next step is to propose potential
solutions within Doctrine, Education, and Personnel. Options include changes to existing
programs or addition of new programs.
DOCTRINE
Research has shown that money can improve conditions on the battlefield if used
correctly. Similar to any other weapon, use of “money as a weapon system” requires accurate
technical information and user training.108 Doctrine covering use of economics is headed in the
right direction, as indicated by the most recent version of the Afghanistan “Money as a Weapons
System” SOP.109 However, an enduring solution will require a more institutional approach.
Option 1: Update Army Doctrine
The primary way to internalize and communicate the expensive lessons of CERP is to
capture them within doctrine, as scholars have recommended.110 To be effective doctrinal
changes should address the following four areas.
a.) Reduce scope of economic doctrine to focus on measurable impacts, with an
emphasis on violence reduction.
According to ADRP 3-0, “Security is the most immediate concern of the military
force.”111 Establishing a “safe and secure environment” is paramount in laying the foundation for
economic development.112 The RCT conducted by Beath, et al. demonstrated this fact, as a
minimum threshold of violence was necessary for economic development to occur
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successfully.113 This is a constant theme throughout the U.S. military’s history of nation building
as campaigns with higher troop levels were more successful. When number of occupation troops
was low relative to the local population, U.S. forces suffered the highest casualties, most notably
Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.114 The high levels of U.S. troops that occupied both countries
were crucial to maintaining civil order during reconstruction in Germany and Japan. In
determining what types of projects to undertake, commanders must consider how well they can
secure them and the local people.
Using the benefit of hindsight from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, we can determine
what types of effects tactical units can accomplish given the vast amount of other demands.
While a wide range of economic development outcomes, such as supporting “broad-based
economic opportunity” would be outstanding accomplishments, they are extremely difficult for
combat units.115 Doctrine must provide specificity and focus leader attention on the highestpayoff interventions in various contexts because every economic intervention has an opportunity
cost in time and money. As the Army’s stability manual states, immediate security needs create
the need for short-term solutions consistent with long-term objectives.116
As mentioned earlier, doctrine explicitly requires that the effects of any economic effort
be measured. However, doctrine does not provide sufficient detail regarding how to do this.
Security outcomes (measured by incidents of violence) can provide a cost-based metric for
commanders and serve unifying outcome variable across complex environments. Using security
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as a measure of effectiveness (MOE) both recognizes the Army’s comparative advantage in
providing security and relies on currently available data (using SIGACTs). Commanders may
also decide to focus on other interim objectives, but these should be hypothesis-based and
subject to testing. By tying tactical economics more closely to security, economic tools become
shaping operations which tie into the commander’s overall mission--establishing security. This
helps solve an incentive problem, as economic development objectives are almost impossible to
be measure in fragile states in the short to medium term. For example, there has often been an
incentive to not start CERP projects toward the end of a unit’s rotation since that commander
would not receive credit due to the long time frame required for measurement.117
b.) Focus on small, conditional projects informed by local needs.
The details of specific projects will vary greatly by context. However, recent studies have
highlighted several clear factors which can guide initial design of economic programs. First,
projects should be relatively small. As both Berman, et al. and Crost, et al. documented, large
projects can be counterproductive by fueling violence as insurgents attempt to discredit the
government. This is good news given the current budget environment, since a given amount of
money could direct benefit many more individuals, in contrast to a single large project that may
benefit only the local elite and possibly increase violence as insurgents seek to discredit the
government.
In order to achieve the desired effect, projects should also be conditional. During COIN
operations, a military is working to achieve support from the local population; as a result, aid
should be tied to the population’s support in reducing violence. While this raises ethical issues in
regard to providing humanitarian relief and restoring essential services, it is vital to keep in mind
117
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that without establishing security, further economic progress is not possible. It is possible that in
some cases CERP unintentionally incentivized violence when commanders directed projects
toward violent areas. In contrast, spending should incentivize stability through conditionality by
channeling funds to the parts of the population that are cooperating with security efforts.118
Lastly, projects should only be undertaken to address stated needs of the population. Both social
science research and government reports have highlighted numerous violations of this principle
with CERP spending.119 In addition to increasing the effectiveness of projects, it will also
conserve limited funds by eliminating unwanted projects.
c.) Revise doctrine to minimize counterproductive interventions.
Given the high opportunity cost of economic interventions, the first rule must be to “do
no harm.” Limited time and money necessitate a strict prioritization between programs, making
it necessary to choose against ineffective programs and vehemently avoid counterproductive
ones. In any intervention--whether conducted by a military or the World Bank--the risk of
adverse effects exists. Designing programs according to correct principles can minimize this risk.
What works will differ in every context, but two areas in which doctrine significantly conflicts
with empirical research are large infrastructure projects and unemployment. Higgins pointed out
that focusing on input metrics has been a problem by incentivizing sheer spending rather than
spending on the most effective programs.120 A large part of the problem was bureaucratic
overhead, as the difficulty in obtaining commitment of funds often overshadowed consideration

Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between
Aid and Security,” Feinstein International Center, January 2012.
119
SIGIR, “Learning From Iraq: A Final Report,” March 2013.
120
MAJ Michael J. Higgins,“Commander’s Emergency Response Program: A Flawed Metric,” School of
Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September, 2012.
118

40
of effects of projects.121 Specifically, manuals should replace mandates to rebuild major
infrastructure and broadly reduce unemployment with a bottom-up, hypothesis-based approach.
Guidance on unemployment efforts should be particularly nuanced due to the tenuous evidence
showing its effect on violence.
d.) Ensure that doctrine is a “living” through its connection to current social science
research.
The body of economic doctrine needs to adapt almost as quickly as social science
research. The Army maintains systems to ensure its doctrine is regularly updated in various
forms. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is central to this process. Due to the rapid
pace of advances in empirical social studies, staying abreast of current studies is even more
important. The application of social science to military operations is a relatively new
phenomenon stemming from population-centric warfare, but should be incorporated into
doctrinal updates. Due to the lag inherent in updating field manuals, generalized doctrine
incorporating the changes mentioned above may be preferable to very specific guidance. CALL
can publish supplemental handbooks as needed to incorporate current insights.
LEADERSHIP & EDUCATION
Policy options within education must address both the gaps in both designing and
evaluating economic programs and. Well-crafted, hypothesis-driven economic shaping
operations will only occur if commanders and staff possess the right intellectual tools with which
to conceptualize and evaluate programs. The two primary mechanisms for addressing the
education gap are through internal and external education.
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Option 2A: Incorporate use of development economics and program evaluation into
professional military education (PME).
The first target audience for tactical economics is the echelon of officers who determine
the range of operations available to tactical units--general officers. The second target audience is
officers responsible for implementation during stability operations--field grade officers (major
through colonel and senior noncommissioned officers). The critical band is quite wide, ranging
from battalion operations officers (major) to division commanders (major general). Target
courses include Command General Staff College (CGSC), pre-command courses, and sergeant
major academy courses. The World War II-era School of Military Government is an example of
successful generation of internal expertise in nation-building prior to the occupations of
Germany and Japan.122 However, the level of resources required for such an intensive course is
not currently justified. An important concern is limited time within PME courses, as adding one
subject/module will require removing something else. Further analysis is necessary to determine
the relative priority of greater economics training for various target audiences.
Option 2B: Acquire economics and evaluation expertise through external education.
The Army has several programs designed to allow leaders to attend civilian academic
programs. The Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) program allows junior and mid-grade officers
attend masters or PhD programs while on active duty. Usually, a “utilization” tour of duty
follows, such as serving as an academic instructor at West Point or as a staff officer within the
Pentagon. While such “broadening” programs are an important mechanism for educating leaders,
the number of officers focusing on social sciences and development economics in particular is
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relatively small. Increasing economics and evaluation expertise in a meaningful way would
require a significant increase in these opportunities.
Executive education is much more informal, depending on education funding possessed
by a particular command. It has the advantage of being able to pinpoint specific leaders who
require specific knowledge and being able to fill knowledge gaps quickly. An example of such
an option is executive education offered by Harvard’s Center for International Development
(CID). Cutting edge classes on development practices and evaluation such as “Leading
Successful Social Programs: Using Evidence to Assess Effectiveness” can provide officers
critical information at the cost of five days and $7,400 per person.123
PERSONNEL
The Army’s two expertise gaps similarly lie in designing economic interventions and
program evaluation. We must first recognize that expertise in development economics is very
limited and it is only possible to pull so many external personnel into the military structure.
Development economics is a small community to begin with. Simply embedding civilian
economists within tactical units is probably not the answer, as shown by the Army’s experience
with the Human Terrain System (HTS), during which social scientists (largely anthropologists)
were embedded in tactical units to fill a gap in cultural expertise. Despite high-level support, the
program did not go as planned and ended in 2014 at great expense ($725 million).124 Issues
included flawed recruiting, insufficient training, poor management, dysfunctional organizational
culture, and an unclear mission.125 This experience indicates that a better model is for the
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military to provide the in-country personnel while researchers provide the reachback capability.
There currently is little organizational appetite within the Army to embed social scientists,
making this approach a non-starter. The Army has two general options for acquiring this
expertise: internally or externally.
Option 3A: Develop economics expertise internally.
In addition to the professional and executive education options discussed in the previous
section, the Army can generate expertise internally through occupational specialties, such as
Civil Affairs. As Civil Affairs personnel are responsible for a wide array of mission sets, they
often lack sufficient training in economics.126 Increasing economics specialization within the
force would come at a cost in other areas, as the Army draws down personnel. To develop
sufficient competence in highly-specialized fields such as development economics, it would be
necessary to generate Army economists through PhD programs. Another option would be to
develop new functional area in economic operations and program evaluation. This option is
similar to the external education option, in that it involves sending soldiers to civilian graduate
schooling, but differs in that those personnel would specialize in economics and evaluation.
Option 3B: Acquire external economics expertise through research grants and
relationships.
This option seeks to gain access to expertise in development and evaluation by
connecting with the social science community. It also recognizes that the Army has a
comparative advantage in security operations while academia has a comparative advantage in
economics expertise. The Army can increase ties with the research community at various levels
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from senior commander to assistant staff officers. Both formal and informal relationships
between tactical officers can feed approved data to researchers, who then can provide analysis
back to operational units. Sugai correctly pointed out that tactical units should build such
relationships with external experts early, since units will not have time to do so while
deployed.127
The specifics of these relationships would vary by command, but one technique could be
for external researchers to focus on a specific region, which would provide continuity of
evaluation as units rotate through deployments. External research grants such as the Minerva
Initiative can also continue to draw in expertise to look at specific research questions. However,
the number of Minerva grants focused on development economics has been small--only two in
2013.128

Stakeholder Analysis
A stakeholder analysis (Appendix E) identifies internal and external stakeholders. Within
the Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is central to advancing proposed
changes. Internal to TRADOC, the two primarily organizations with a stake are the Army
Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and the Combined Arms Center (CAC). As an
intellectual center, the CAC is sometimes referred to as the “engine of change for the Army.”129
It houses CALL and is responsible for writing doctrine and developing military education.
Within CAC, the Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE), is responsible for
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addressing AWFC 2 (Shape the Security Environment). ARCIC is responsible for developing
capabilities that address the Army’s warfighting challenges.
Outside the Army, the academic research community has an interest in the military
economic efforts, primarily in the declassified economic data they can receive from the Army.
Additionally, the international development community (including USAID) can benefit from
studies conducted using Army data. A 2005 estimate of program evaluation for humanitarian aid
and reconstruction assistance by a civilian program added 20% to the cost for security
overhead.130 In many cases, development organizations may not even be able to obtain basic
survey data from the population due to violence, which severely limited outcome evaluation
Thus a partnership with the Army could provide significant value to such external stakeholders.

Policy Option Evaluation
The preceding five policy options are largely interconnected and will thus require a
holistic implementation approach. Further, the Army is currently deployed to 150 different
countries and faces rapidly-changing conventional and unconventional threats in the midst of an
uncertain budget environment. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to evaluate the preceding
policy options to determine the best blend of options and most effective sequencing for
implementation. Recognizing that a finite amount of organizational resources is available,
tradeoffs will be necessary and investments will have to be focused on the highest payoff
activities. I use the following three evaluation criteria to help determine this:
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Tactical Effectiveness: Will the policy option make a measureable impact on the ground?
Operational Adaptability:131 Does the policy option provide maximum flexibility for future
operating environments?
Organizational Feasibility - Can the Army implement proposed change given current mission
and budgetary constraints?
(See Appendix D for detailed description of evaluation criteria.)
The following matrix sums up evaluation of the policy options using a qualitative
assessment to estimate a High/Medium/Low rating.
Table 3: Results of Policy Option Evaluation
Evaluation Criteria
Tactical
Effectiveness

Operational
Adaptability

Organizational
Feasibility

High

Medium

Medium

2A: Internal Education

Medium

Low

High

2B: External Education

High

High

High

3A: Internal Expertise

High

Medium

Low

3B. External Expertise

Medium

High

Medium

Policy Option
1: Update Doctrine

As Table 3 illustrates, the three most attractive policy options are to update doctrine,
expand external education, and acquire external expertise. The following recommendations will
focus largely on implementing these top three options. Although all five alternatives can add
value, the limited amount of organizational resources available makes it advisable to prioritize
the top three options. (Appendix F sums up evaluation notes on all five policy options.)
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Priority #1: Expand External Education
Increasing the level of external education emerged as the most attractive policy option. It
is high-impact, extremely flexible, and easy to implement. The knowledge provided by civilian
graduate programs and executive education) would improve leader ability to both integrate
economic programs into operations as well as evaluate the outcomes of economic programs.
With the right choice of curricula, external education can extremely responsive to innovation
within the development and evaluation fields. The mechanisms for implementation already exist
but would require a change focus areas (increased study of development economics) and
potential expansion of broadening opportunities for select commanders and staff. The most
difficult aspect of this option is documenting the benefits received for the cost in time and
money, given numerous competing demands for leader time.
Priority #2: Acquire External Expertise
Acquiring external expertise scored highly in both impact and flexibility. Greater access
to expertise within social science can significantly assist commanders and staff in designing and
evaluating economic programs. This option could be structured to provide reachback capability
so that the right expertise is available during overseas deployments. Flexibility will be high as
researchers remain in academia with ready access to the latest theories and methods. The Army
can incorporate new ideas and insights into operations and possibly test in the field through
hypothesis-based programs. External researchers can help provide continuity in evaluations by
observing long term trends within an area. This would require developing relationships with
multiple units. Implementation may be challenging due to differences in organizational culture
between the military and the research community. However, the previous policy option can help
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break down barriers as more leaders gain access to external education and build relationships
within academia.
Priority #3: Update Army Doctrine
Changes to doctrine would be far-reaching, as they would impact the entire Army and
possibly influence joint doctrine. However, field manuals can only provide general guidelines for
designing economic interventions. Similar to more conventional forms of military operations,
success will depend on the level of expertise within individual units as they design programs to
meet the needs of specific areas of operations. Flexibility is limited due to the long lead time and
consensus required to update doctrinal literature. Interpreting social science research can be
complex, which makes achieving consensus more difficult. Organizational feasibility is also
limited, as the Army’s focus is likely to remain on conventional rather than population-centric
threats in the near term.

Recommendations
I break down recommendations by time frame (short, medium, and long term) according
to the priority assigned to each policy option. This will assist in appropriate sequencing during
implementation.
Short Term (1-2 years)
In the short term, further studies can demonstrate the applicability of economic programs
to the Army warfighting challenges. This initiative can progress simultaneously on formal and
informal fronts. Formal efforts will benefit from a champion at the senior level, preferably within
TRADOC. This leader is necessary to legitimize research efforts and shift both organizational
and intellectual resources to tactical economics initiatives. A senior leader can also encourage
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informal “intrapreneurship,” which can harness intellectual assets both internal and external to
the Army with little organizational overhead or additional cost.
1. Expand executive education and broadening programs. Send greater numbers of
Army officers to executive education courses focused on development economics and program
evaluation. This will increase knowledge for design economic programs help acquire skills in
and leader buy-in for an evidence-based approach. It will also provide commanders and staff the
intellectual tools they need to properly employ experts in program evaluation.
2. Strengthen ties with the social science research community. Building working
relationships (formal and informal) will provide the Army access to some of the top minds who
are working to understand many of the same problems facing the military within conflictaffected states. This relationship can be synergistic, as the Army can provide declassified data to
researchers, whose incentive to publish research will benefit the Army through greater insights
into the effect of economic interventions on conflict.
3. Thoroughly analyze CERP data from Iraq and Afghanistan. This will involve
consolidating CERP data from Iraq and Afghanistan and making a declassified version available
to both military and civilian researchers. Interviews of both current and former Army personnel
with experience employing CERP will also capture vital lessons and provide context for
statistical analysis. Research grants may be necessary to accomplish both quantitative and
qualitative studies quickly enough to maintain momentum.
4. Begin to update informal doctrine. While a comprehensive doctrinal update will
occur along a longer time frame, CALL can achieve a “quick win” by publishing a handbook
summarizing the existing clear lessons regarding what has worked and what has not worked with
tactical economic programs.
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Medium Term (3-5 years)
After the value of tactical economics becomes better understood and accepted, the next
step will be to institutionalize it as a doctrinal capability and continue to acquire a higher level of
expertise.
1. Formalize relationships with the social science community. As the mutuallybeneficial relationship between the research community and the Army becomes more clear, these
relationships should be institutionalized through formal research structures. Some level of
funding from the military will likely be necessary to sustain this initiative.
2. Revise key doctrinal manuals. As the Army publishes updated versions of FM 3-24
and ADRP 3-07, new insights into economic operations should be incorporated so that the force
shifts from a top-down to a coherent evidence-based approach to tactical economics. A
component of the doctrinal change should be specifics of a CERP-like program that provides a
core capability in tactical economic stabilization during population-centric operations. This
should include specific, hypothesis-based interventions with an evaluation plan. Commanders
can use economic pilot programs as “scouts” to build knowledge of causal effects in a specific
region during a population-centric conflict.
Long Term (6-10 years)
Over the long term, as tactical economic capabilities are tested overseas, it will be
possible to evaluate and refine these programs. The Army’s required capabilities are a function
of current and future threats. As these threats evolve, it is necessary to adapt in response.
1. Revise Army professional military education (PME). In the long term, PME courses
should be adapted reflect doctrinal changes and incorporate design of effective economic
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interventions and program evaluation. The amount of time devoted should be commensurate
with the target audience and any demonstrated benefit during operations in the intervening years.
2. Establish a “Tactical Economics Center of Excellence.” This institution can be the
hub for channeling data and lessons learned from the force to the research community, and
disseminating research insights from academia back to the force. It can provide the nexus where
researchers and practitioners interact and can pursue a mission of diminishing the conflict
evaluation gap. Incentivizing commanders to pursue an evidence-based approach by supporting
research efforts can help institutionalize learning and adaptation. The most likely location would
be within the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC).

Conclusion
Carl Schramm, former chairman of the Kauffman Foundation, has noted that the U.S.
military is “well placed to play a leading role in bringing economic growth to devastated
countries. It may have little resident economic expertise, but it has both an active presence and
an active interest in places where economic growth is sorely needed.”132 This statement is correct
regarding the military’s placement and lack of expertise, however, the causal link between the
military’s efforts and economic growth has not been adequately established. Adoption of an
evidence-based approach in partnership with the social science community can overcome the
latter two issues while capitalizing on the Army’s ability to operate in violent environments. As
DOD’s primary ground force, the U.S. Army’s has both a comparative and absolute advantage in
providing security on a global scale. By combining this advantage with the right expertise, the
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Army can lead the way in generating data that, when placed in the hands of the right researchers,
can generate an array of new insight into conflict.
Focusing on violence reduction as a primary outcome variable can enable tactical units to
more effectively establish the security conditions necessary for successful transition to
specialized agencies for reconstruction and development efforts. While it is possible that military
efforts can lay the foundation for future economic growth, the time frame is too long and the
metrics too ambiguous for the Army to operationalize in a cost-effective manner. Focusing on
empirically-evaluated outcomes of economic interventions can add granularity to the policy
debate and produced tangible results that the future Army, “Force 2025,” can employ in
unknown future operating environments. By adopting an evidence-based approach to tactical
economics, the U.S. Army can develop a key nonlethal capability that can powerfully shape the
security environment and enable it to “win in a complex world.”
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Appendix A - Hierarchy of Evidence

Source: Harrison, Todd and John Speed Meyers. “Contracting Under Fire: Lessons Learned in Wartime
Contracting and Expeditionary Economics.” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 2012. p. 3.

64

Appendix B - Key Empirical Studies of Conflict
Author(s)
Berman, Felter
Shapiro, and
Troland

Beath, Christia,
and Enikolopov

Paper

Topic/Type of Study

Findings

“Modest, Secure and
Informed: Successful
Development in Conflict
Zones” (2013)

Effects CERP spending
during 2007 Iraq surge

-Large reconstruction projects
increased insurgent violence.

Natural experiment
(Regression
discontinuity)

-CERP was most effective when
projects were small (<$50k),
troop strength was high, and
development expertise was
available.

“Winning Hearts and
Minds Through
Development: Evidence
from a Field Experiment in
Afghanistan”
(2012)

Afghan National
Solidarity Program
(NSP)

-Village participation in NSP
improved perceptions of wellbeing, attitudes toward
government, and local security.

RCT
-Effect did not occur in areas with
high initial violence.
-Suggests minimum security
threshold for development
programs to be effective.

Crost, Felter, and
Johnston

“Aid Under Fire:
Development Projects and
and Civil Conflict” (2014)

Philippine communitydriven development
(CDD) program
(KALAHI-CIDSS)

-Development projects increased
insurgent violence if governments
could not secure projects or
credibly commit to upholding
agreements with villages

Natural experiment
(Regression
discontinuity)
Crost, Felter, and
Johnston

Khanna and
Zimmerman

“Conditional Cash
Transfers, Civil Conflict
and Insurgent Influence:
Experimental Evidence
from the Philippines”
(2016)

Effect of conditional cash
transfers (CCTs) on
conflict in the Philippines

“Fighting Maoist Violence
with Promises: Evidence
from India’s Employment
Guarantee Scheme” (2014)

Effect of the National
Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme
(NREGS)on Maoist
violence in India

RCT

Natural experiment
(Difference-indifference)
Malkasian and
Meyerle

“Provincial
Reconstruction Teams:
How Do We Know They
Work?” (2009)

Impact of PRT spending
in Afghanistan
Observational

-CCTs reduced conflict and
insurgent influence in villages
-The effect may have been due to
shifting violence to untreated
villages
-Introducing the program caused
large increase in violence in the
short run, mainly driven by policeinitiated attacks
-Program made police more
effective at tracking insurgents
due to citizen support

-Positive correlation between
PRT spending and district
security ratings for Khost and
Ghazni provinces in 2007.
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-In 2008, violence in Khost
increased despite increase in
PRT project funds.
Iyengar, Monten,
and Hanson

Berman, Callen,
Felter, and
Shapiro

“Building Peace: The
Impact of Aid on the Labor
Market for Insurgent”
(2011)

Effect of employment on
violence in Iraq

-Labor intensive programs
reduced insurgent violence

Observational

-10% increase in labor programs
reduced violence by 10%

“Do Working Men Rebel?
Insurgency and
Unemployment in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the
Philippines” (2011)

Effect of unemployment
on insurgencies

-No statistically-significant
relationship between
unemployment and insurgent
violence

Observational

-Higher employment may make it
harder for government forces to
buy information
Dube and Naidu

“Bases, Bullets, and
Ballots: The Effect of U.S.
Military Aid on Political
Conflict in Colombia”
(2010)

Impact of U.S. military
aid on violence in
Colombia

-A 1% increase in military aid
increased paramilitary attacks by
1.5%

Observational

-Military aid reduces voter turnout
in municipalities where U.S.
assistance rises
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Appendix C - DOD CERP Reporting Requirements
CERP Quarterly Report Commander’s Narrative
1. Each quarterly report, submitted in accordance with section 270402, will contain a Commander’s
Narrative from the Commander, MNC-I and Commander, CJTF in Afghanistan that at the beginning of
each fiscal establishes:
A. Commander’s overall goals for the CERP funding
B. At least three supporting areas of emphasis for using the funding
C. How progress against the identified goals will be judged
2. Each quarter the Commander’s Narrative will review the goals as required above and report progress
achieved against the identified goals, using the above noted methods.
A. Significant events/issues that have occurred since the previous quarterly report
B. Adequacy of projected funding
C. Areas anticipated to be of interest to USCENTCOM, HQDA, OSD and Congress
D. Any problems arising in the transfer of completed projects to the government
E. Impact of security situation on monitoring of CERP funded projects
F. Newly approved projects > $500,000 and the category of any project
G. Projects > $500,000 that were completed during the quarter and category of each project.
H. Contributions each project > $500,000 made to humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts
for the benefit of the Iraqi and Afghan people.
I. Efforts made to obtain donor funding for projects and results obtained.
J. Identification of any projects or category of projects that are cost-shared and with whom.
K. Date that projects were turned over to the appropriate government.
L. Impacts of CERP funded projects, individually and collectively in assisting the U.S. carry out
its strategy.
M. For Iraq, progress made in identifying and pursuing opportunities to transition responsibility
for larger economic revitalization efforts to the Government of Iraq (GoI) including;
• The level of funding from the GoI into I-CERP;
• The level of funding provided by GoI through other programs to meet urgent humanitarian relief and
reconstruction requirements that immediately assist the Iraqi people; and
• The status of efforts to transition Sons/Daughters of Iraq to the GoI.
Source: Department of Defense. “Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 27:
Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP)” (DOD 7000.14-R) January 2009. pp. 27-5 - 27-6
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Appendix D - Evaluation Criteria
Criterion and Description

Potential Means of Measurement

Tactical Effectiveness
●
●
●

Short to medium effect on security
Medium to long-term effect on
consolidation of gains
Long term effect on economy, though this
will largely fall to development
organizations

●
●
●

Measures of violence (insurgent attacks,
IED detonations, intimidation of civilians,
etc.)
Local support for government
Economic indicators

Operational Adaptability
●
●

Can proposed policies be adapted to
different regions and contexts?
Do policy options meet expectations of
the Army Operating Concept?

●
●

Qualitative ranking of alternatives based
on adaptability
External validity of economic
interventions as documented in research

Political Feasibility
●
●
●

How much “organizational bandwidth” is
available to consider proposed changes
Do proposed changes fit within existing
programs or policies?
Are senior leaders willing to support the
proposed changes?

●
●
●

Organizational resources available
Leader buy-in/support as estimated by
published literature and interviews
Amount of change established units would
have to experience to implement changes
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Appendix E - Stakeholder Analysis
Category

Organizations

Role

U.S. Army

ARCIC (within TRADOC)

Responsible for developing future
capabilities and addressing the Army
Warfighting Challenges

CAC (within TRADOC)

Responsible for writing Army Doctrine

Forces Command (FORSCOM)

Responsible for generating land forces for
combatant commanders

U.S. Department
of Defense

Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC)

Develops joint doctrine

U.S. Government

USAID

Partnership/information sharing (possibly
through the Interagency Conflict Assessment
Framework)

State Department

Partnership/information sharing

Development Agencies (World
Bank, Millennium Challenge
Corporation, etc.)

Best practices for economic interventions and
program evaluation.

International
Development
Community

Information sharing
Academic
Research
Community

University social science and
economics departments

Expertise and research initiatives

Research Centers (Center for
Global Development, Center for
International Development)

Expertise and research initiatives

69

Appendix F - Policy Option Evaluation Matrix
Evaluation Criteria
Tactical Effectiveness

Operational Adaptability

Organizational Feasibility

Proposed
Changes
1. Doctrine

-Would impact entire Army
-Could bring insights of
social science to the field

-Doctrine can only be
updated periodically
-Requires a level of
consensus before
proceeding

-Requires leader
prioritization
-Requires investment in time
and expertise

2A.
Education
(Internal)

-Difficult to gain sufficient
economics knowledge
given limited time and
many competing topics
-Will diffuse knowledge to
the force at rate at which
leaders cycle through PME

-Relatively less flexible, as
curriculum changes with
doctrine

-Requires a level of senior
leader consensus to revise
military education

2B.
Education
(External)

-Could provide
commanders and staff
current knowledge of best
practices
-Greater familiarity with
empirical tools can help
create a “learning culture”
within the Army

-Offers a high degree of
flexibility since soldiers
can learn current research
and methods (depending
on specific programs)

-Relatively easy to send
soldiers to seminars and
executive education
-Can target specific
segments of leaders who
are interest in and will apply
the knowledge.
-Army Civil Education (ACS)
program exists to send
soldiers to graduate
programs

3A.
Expertise
(Internal)

-Embedded “soldiereconomists” could
incorporate economics
knowledge within tactical
units

-With connections to
academia and continuing
education, soldiers can
stay up to date on current
research and methods

-High opportunity cost of
devoting soldiers to
economics
-Current personnel
drawdown makes uniformed
personnel more scarce

3B.
Expertise
(External)

-Commanders would have
access to the latest
research insights in
designing and evaluating
programs
-Provides access to
research networks within
academia, potentially
increasing collaboration

-Extremely adaptable, as
external researchers have
access to cutting edge
knowledge of research
methods and insights
-Civilian researchers have
incentive to produce
cutting-edge research

-Researchers will be willing
to work with the Army if it
provides data and flexibility
-Dependent upon Army
leaders placing value on
research and building
working relationships
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